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In the article Achieving Outcomes-Based Life Cycle Management (Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal, Vol. 17, January 2009), the authors traced the history of DoD 
acquisition reform efforts and highlighted the dramatic geo-political changes that impact the 





agility and affordability to posture the DoD life cycle processes to meet the demands of the 
21st Century:  
 Effects-based requirements, 
 Commercially driven research and development, and 
 Outcome-based partnership life cycle product support. 
Since that effort, the DoD and Congress have moved forward with several policy-
level efforts, directed towards enhancing accountability and agility over the life cycle, 
including: 
 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act implementation, 
 Insourcing, 
 Product Support Assessment Team, 
 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 805, and  
 HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform 
This paper reviews those recent policy efforts and assesses the potential impact of 
those efforts on the inherent, structural incentives that are embedded in DoD life cycle 
processes.  The paper provides several recommendations for policy implementation to 
further enable life cycle agility and affordability. 
Introduction & Background 
In the article Achieving Outcomes-Based Life Cycle Management, the authors 
summarized 60 years of acquisition reform efforts and concluded that incremental reform 
efforts are insufficient to enable the agility and efficiency required by the current national 
security environment.  The geo-political environment of the 21st century is dramatically 
different than the post-World War II environment (that enabled the current acquisition 
process), as summarized in Table 1.  Those differences required a fundamental re-





Table 1. Prior Acquisition Reform Efforts 
 Acquisition and Logistics Characteristics 
Acquisition and Logistics 
Outcomes 
Reform Effort Strengths Weaknesses Capability Agility Efficiency
Packard Commission Attention to acquisition 
streamlining 
Expensive, lengthy 
acquisitions continue YES NO NO 
Specs/Stds Reform Best commercial 
practices 
Modernization "death 
spiral" YES NO NO 
JCIDS Capabilities based on 
joint warfighter needs 
Disconnect between born 
joint and employed joint YES NO NO 
The Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 




- Improved DoD 
workforce 
-No inherent performance 
incentive 
-“Inspect in” Program 
Stability 








- Extended BCA Process 
-Extended Peer Review 
-Shortened Contract length 









YES NO NO 
2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review 




commercial dual use 
technology use 
-Further reviews = 
Increased oversight 
-review process includes 
parties with “no skin in the 
game” 




Innovation and industry 









with DoD providers 
  YES YES YES 
Those core differences were noted by Secretary Gates: 
What we need is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across 
the widest possible spectrum of conflict.  As a result, we must change the way we 
think and the way we plan, and fundamentally reform the way we do business and 
buy weapons.  It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design 
and buy, as we have for the last 60 years, only the most technologically advanced 
weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary, especially 
one that imploded nearly a generation ago. (Gates, 2009) 
Based upon those differences, the authors concluded that the DoD required life cycle 
management processes that built upon inherent incentives and competition and enabled for 
greater agility and efficiency (affordability).  The authors proposed three fundamental 
reforms: 





 Commercially driven research and development, and 
 Outcome-based partnership life cycle product support. 
Since that publication, the DoD and Congress have initiated several reform efforts. 
The question to be assessed is, “Do current reform efforts enhance agility and affordability?”  
Key criteria to address that question include: 
 Recognition and migration to a warfighter driven, effects-based requirements 
process; 
 Enablement of a more commercial-like R&D model, where industry has a vested 
interest in moving through product development quickly; 
 Outcomes-based sustainment models that provides required readiness at 
reduced costs; 
 Competitive industrial base that naturally fosters innovation and agility; and 
 Life cycle workforce that includes the appropriate core competencies in sufficient 
strength. 
  
The authors reviewed ongoing reform efforts against those key criteria.  Ongoing 
efforts included: 
 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 
 Insourcing, 
 Product Support Assessment Team, 
 FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 805, and 
 HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform (Interim Findings and 
Recommendation). 
These major reform efforts are summarized below. 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) 
On May 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Weapon System Acquisition Reform 
Act, marking an important step in the procurement reform process. The objective of the 
2009 Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act is to eliminate some of the waste and 
inefficiency in defense projects. The Reform Act targeted improving the DoD’s ability to 
efficiently and effectively provide the warfighter with necessary weapons and equipment 
through the following provisions (Levin, 2009): 
 
 Assessing the extent to which the Department has in place the systems 
engineering capabilities needed to ensure that key acquisition decisions are 
supported by a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering process. 






 Require the DoD to reestablish the position of Director of Developmental Test 
and Evaluation. 
 Require the military departments to assess their developmental testing 
organizations and personnel, and address any shortcomings in such 
organizations and personnel, making it the responsibility of the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to periodically review and assess 
the technological maturity of critical technologies used in MDAPs. The DDR&E’s 
determinations would serve as a basis for determining whether a program is 
ready to enter the acquisition process. 
 Establish a Director of Independent Cost Assessment to ensure that cost 
estimates for major defense acquisition programs are fair, reliable, and unbiased.  
 Require the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to seek and consider 
input from the commanders of the combatant commands in identifying joint 
military requirements.  
 Require consultation between the budget, requirements and acquisition 
stovepipes—including consultation in the joint requirements process—to ensure 
the consideration of trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance early in 
the process of developing major weapon systems.  
 Require the completion of a PDR and a formal post-PDR assessment before a 
major defense acquisition program receives Milestone B approval to ensure a 
sufficient knowledge base as well as to ensure technological maturity and avoid 
“a long cycle of instability, budget and requirements changes, costly delays and 
repeated re-base lining.”  
 Require the Department of Defense to implement competitive prototyping, dual-
sourcing, funding of a second source for next generation technology, utilization of 
open architectures to ensure competition for upgrades, periodic competitions for 
subsystem upgrades, licensing of additional suppliers, government oversight of 
make-or-buy decisions—to maximize competition throughout the life of a 
program, periodic program reviews, and requirement of added competition at the 
subcontract level.  
 Enhance the use of Nunn-McCurdy as a management tool by requiring MDAPs 
that experience critical cost growth: (a) be terminated unless the Secretary 
certifies (with reasons and supporting documentation) that continuing the 
program is essential to the national security and the program can be modified to 
proceed in a cost-effective manner; and (b) receive a new Milestone Approval 
(and associated certification) prior to the award of any new contract or contract 
modification extending the scope of the program.  
 Prohibit systems engineering contractors from participating in the development or 
construction of the major weapon systems on which they are advising the 
Department of Defense. 
 Require tightened oversight of organizational conflicts of interests by contractors 
in the acquisition of major weapon systems.  
 Establish an annual awards program—modeled on the Department’s successful 





significant contributions to the improved cost, schedule, and performance of 
defense acquisition programs. 
Congress intended to build on and strengthen its previous reform efforts by 
tightening regulations designed to foster competition and by requiring termination of 
programs that run over-budget and attempt to change how major defense acquisition 
programs are acquired. Congress and the administration heralded the legislation as a much-
needed fix to the Pentagon’s acquisition process. 
The DoD is moving forward with WSARA implementation.  As those efforts unfold, 
some suggest that WSARA may exacerbate some of the problems the act was intended to 
rectify by duplicating existing regulations with additional layers of bureaucracy and an 
oversight that could slow even further a system that already lacks agility and 
responsiveness (Erwin, 2010). 
Furthermore, the act appears to increase the probability that weapons programs that 
breach Nunn-McCurdy legislation will be terminated when they exceed their projected costs 
by 25%. Missing from the act is any acknowledgment of the DoD’s role in making changes 
to programs, adding requirements, and/or demanding additional conditions on the 
development of the weapons system that caused costs to rise (Goure, 2009). 
The above concerns may be valid, but with only a year of implementation, little 
empirical evidence exists to ascertain the effectiveness of WSARA in enhancing agility and 
affordability.  The act does provide guidance concerning COCOM engagement with the 
requirements process, broader competition (and enablers) for system development and 
upgrades, and enhanced acquisition workforce. The potential benefits of the structural 
aspects of the act may be illuminated by comparing the DoD’s recent efforts on the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and the ongoing Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV) program. 
In February 2005, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) identified an urgent 
operational need in Iraq and Afghanistan for armored tactical vehicles to increase crew 
protection and mobility of Marines operating in areas containing improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire (Sullivan, 2008).  The 
ensuing MRAP acquisition program established minimal operational requirements and relied 
heavily on commercially available products (Sullivan, 2008). The development of MRAP 
significantly reduced the IED threat to United States ground forces operating in Iraq, swiftly 
and effectively. Within two years of program start, more than 16,000 vehicles were produced 
at rates occasionally exceeding 1,000 vehicles per month (Sullivan, 2008). 
In comparison, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program was developed in response 
to similar threats and was intended to be the successor to the 11 different versions of the 
High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HUMMWV) (Feickert, 2009). In late 2006, the DoD 
launched a major procurement initiative.  Seven industry teams conducted initial design 
efforts: AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems, BAE Systems, Cadillac Gage, 
Force Protection, Lockheed Martin, Oshkosh and Protected Vehicles.  The program 
acquisition strategy employed competitive prototyping, which resulted in three teams 
brought forward into a prototype phase (as contracted to the MRAP that were immediately 
procured). 
As MRAP was fielded and the JLTV prototypes emerged, military leaders refined 
their requirements for JLTV, requesting a tactical mobile vehicle with traditional combat 





requirements creep.  As a result, payload requirements have increased for most of the Army 
variants, including the utility vehicle, up 200 pounds to 5,500; the command vehicle, up 880 
pounds to 5, 100; and the ground maneuver vehicle, up 400 pounds to 6, 700 (Osborn, 
2007). Other added requirements include: 
 Make 30 kilowatts of electricity, 
 Tow a trailer with ammunition and supplies, 
 Carry more ammo, 
 Increase fuel efficiency to 90 ton-miles per gallon at maximum gross vehicle 
weight, 
 Be equipped with the A-kit armor and add on option to add a B-kit that includes a 
gunner's protective shield, and 
 Be able to run on two flat tires and keep going after a small-arms attack.  
Unlike the MRAP program, the JLTV program did not integrate the available 
components and COTS subsystems early in the process.  The Services continue to modify 
subsystems to meet additional requirements or develop new technologies and lengthen the 
system’s acquisition schedule.  This contrast in approaches to requirements determination 
and acquisition strategy results in the development timelines shown in Figure 1. 



























Figure 1. MRAP & JLTV Program Timelines 
The extended development timeline for JLTV results in additional requirements for 





HASC Panel on Acquisition Reform chided the DoD on its extended development timeline; 
however, the DoD and Congress need to evaluate and rationalize their desires for rapid 
acquisition and competitive prototyping. 
The USMC Unmanned Aerial Re-supply (UAR) effort may provide an illustrative 
example for future consideration.  The UAR program was initiated in spring 2008 in 
response to an urgent operational requirement to provide vertical supply distribution in Iraq 
with requirements focused on lift capability and endurance.  The program will become a 
force multiplier and lessen casualties by reducing USMC ground convoy logistics 
requirements.  The USMC awarded a competitive fly-off of existing capabilities in 2009, 
which will be followed by industry proposals.  The USMC intends to select a UAR vehicle by 
late 2010 and obtain industry-provided service capability by early 2011.  From requirements 
to capability, a total time of approximately 28-30 months is achievable.  Naval Air Systems 
Command is assessing acquisition strategy alternatives that include a traditional 
development and production options.  Such an approach would delay fielding existing 
capabilities. 
Insourcing 
By the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the United States Congress 
reversed two decades of acquisition workforce reduction. The act includes explicit 
requirements to “strengthen the DoD program management, systems engineering, cost 
analysis, and contract administration workforce.”  The act also requires the DoD to 
“insource” program management and acquisition support functions that had been previously 
contracted out. 
To fulfill the requirements of the act, the DoD resourced 20,000 additional acquisition 
positions in its FY10 budget.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense also issued guidance 
on the insourcing process, including specific acquisition functions and broader contract 
services.  The guidance anticipates the insourcing process will proceed through 2012 with 
concentration on acquisition management positions. 
In a recent paper by the Federal Acquisition Innovation and Reform Institute (FAIR), 
the authors advise a deliberate and systematic approach to insourcing, based on facts and 
analysis, to include business case analysis and full consideration of inherently governmental 
positions, as well as core competencies. The paper further recommends careful assessment 
of federal pay scales to ensure competitive recruiting (Sharma, 2009). 
The concerns noted by FAIR appear justified based upon the recent injunction by the 
Federal District Court of San Antonio to stop an Air Force insourcing of audio/visual support, 
which had been provided by Rohmann Services, Inc., a small business.  The Rohmann 
Services, Inc., suit contended the Air Force used inaccurate cost estimates to justify the 
insourcing, and the cost analysis failed to include government overhead, benefits, and 
overtime (Hendricks). The Air Force now has opted to recomplete the contract of August 
2010. 
The Defense Science Board (DSB) study on integrating commercial systems into the 
DoD provides additional insights into the future requirements of the DoD workforce.  As the 
DoD and Congress move to accelerate development timelines, one reasonable approach is 
greater reliance on commercially available systems and subsystems (DSB, 2009). The DSB 
study highlighted the wide dispersion of how commercial solutions are acquired across the 





specifications, which drove major changes to COTS equipment.  If the DoD is to capitalize 
on a competitive commercial market, insourcing efforts must allow for commercially savvy 
acquisition personnel to join the federal workforce. 
Finally, the focus on acquisition “insourcing” has been extended by the Air Force to 
include weapon system sustainment tasks.  Recent statements by the Secretary of Air Force 
indicate a clear desire to “insource” both product support integration and supply chain 
management functions.  This stated desire is based on a perception that the Service is 
losing its product support capability.  These statements are inconsistent with current DoD 
policy, FY10 NDAA Section 805 provisions, and best practices, as demonstrated by ongoing 
performance-based partnership programs.   
DoD Product Support Assessment Team (PSAT) 
In September 2008, a DoD Product Support Assessment Team (PSAT) was formed 
to analyze DoD product support enterprise activities, performance, and cost, and to outline 
actions for a way ahead for life cycle product support management (Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense, 2008). The team completed an assessment of overall and program-specific 
progress in capturing, managing, and reducing weapon system support costs while 
maintaining necessary readiness levels and mitigating sustainment risk (PSAT, 2009). 
The PSAT found that DoD product support is characterized by a dependence on 
transactional-based systems and processes, inadequate human capital, organizational 
challenges, and a lack of shared goals  (PSAT, 2009). Additionally, the PSAT study found 
that performance-based (outcome-based) product support strategies with government-
industry partnering, have delivered superior materiel readiness across multiple weapon 
system applications.  The PSAT provided eight principle recommendations (PSAT, 2009): 
 Adopt a product support business model that drives cost effective performance 
and capability for the warfighter across the weapons system life cycle and 
enables the most advantageous use of an integrated defense industrial base; 
 Align and expand the collaboration between government and industry that 
produces best-value partnering practices, both within and beyond the depots; 
 Connect platform product support strategies to enterprise supply chain 
approaches that produce best value across the DoD components; 
 Improve weapons system governance so sustainment factors are better 
considered early and consistently across a weapons system life cycle; 
 Develop an overarching DoD sustainment metric and management strategy for 
life cycle product support that strengthens formal data collection and analysis 
capabilities while providing insight and learning to support life cycle planning and 
operational management; 
 Make life cycle affordability a core business process for all communities and 
stakeholders involved in system acquisition and sustainment; 
 Clarify and codify policies and procedures pertaining to the use of analytical tools 
in the life cycle product support decision-making process; and 
 Integrate product support competencies across the logistics and acquisition 






The DoD is moving forward with implementing the PSAT recommendations.  As that 
implementation proceeds, the requirements for greater scrutiny and competition for service 
contracts are also being implemented.  These simultaneous implementations create 
conflicting pressures that are evidenced by: 
 Extended timelines to conduct, review, and approve business case analyses; 
 Extended peer reviews at the Service and OSD level; and 
 Reduce contract lengths to enable continuous re-competitions. 
As these pressures unfold, the DoD is refining its performance-based partnerships 
for programs such as the C-17 and F-22. The refinements of the C-17 and F-22 platform-
level PBL sustainment strategies were both preceded by business case analyses (BCAs). 
Both BCAs documented difficulties in characterizing future performance for sustainment 
options, accurately capturing government costs, and estimating potential transition costs. As 
a result, the USAF requested an independent assessment of both BCAs by OSD. 
Both programs have been designated as lead programs for implementing the PSAT 
recommendations. The work share between government and industry is currently being 
evaluated for both programs, and transition plans are being developed. The key issue to be 
addressed through the transition is to retain an outcomes-based strategy for both programs 
as work (and responsibility) is re-aligned to the Air Force. 
Life Cycle Management and Product Support: The National Defense 
Authorization Act, Section 805 
Section 805 of the 2010 Authorization Act provided statutory guidance on life cycle 
management, including the requirement for a product support manager for all major 
systems, maximize competition at the system, subsystem, and component level, and 
outcome-focused product support strategies. The product support manager shall be 
responsible for (House of Representatives, 2009): 
 Development and implementation of a comprehensive product support strategy 
for the weapon system; 
 Providing appropriate cost analysis to validate the product support strategy, 
including cost-benefit analysis as outlined in Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-94; 
 Assuring achievement of desired product support outcomes through 
development and implementation of appropriate product support arrangements; 
 Adjusting performance requirements and resource allocations across product 
support integrators and product support providers as necessary to optimize 
implementation of the product support strategy; 
 The periodic review of product support arrangements between the product 
support integrators and product support providers to ensure the arrangements 
are consistent with the overall product support strategy; and 
 Revalidating any business-case analysis performed in support of the product 
support strategy. 
Section 805’s enactment is intended to enhance competition while leveraging 





performance.  More importantly, it begins to attack an important issue of acquisition reform: 
accountability.  The DoD is currently preparing its implementation plan and report. 
Based on recent market data, the Section 805 focus on competition for product 
support is well founded.  Figure 2 presents the competitive nature of the sustainment 
market.  As shown, several elements of sustainment are intensively competitive; however, 
spare parts continue to be a relatively non-competitive market. These data suggest that the 
DoD should focus on developing alternate sources for critical parts, rather than shortening 





































Figure 2. Competitive Product Support 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is aggressively moving forward to achieve end-
to-end supply chain management and foster greater competition. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) directs the largest and most complex supply chain in the world.  The DoD 
spends at least $150 billion a year on goods and services and their delivery to end users 
(Daily, 2005).  DLA manages an inventory of tens of thousands of items, valued at 
approximately $80 billion.  The DoD supply chain also includes hundreds of original 
equipment manufacturers, many of which not only produce new items but also help support 
systems and platforms in the field (DLA, 2006). 
USA’s BRAC 2005 process recommended that the US Defense Logistics Agency 
privatize a series of product commodities, and eliminate the government’s wholesale stock 
in key areas.  These Commodity Management Privatization (CMP) activities take place with 
goals that include improved delivery and management, lower, more transparent cost of 





mutually beneficial objectives to improve logistics operations and warfighter support (DLA, 
2006). 
The Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC, DLA), the supply chain manager for 
tires, competitively awarded a contract worth $368 million for aviation tires with Michelin for 
a base period of five years and an additional five-year option period, worth more than $300 
million.  Under this contract, Michelin has the responsibility for procurement, storage, and 
distribution of these tires, as well as the disposal of scrap tires for CONUS locations and 
pick-up of re-treadable tires for CONUS and OCONUS locations.   
The privatization effort of aircraft tires continues to save the customer and the DoD 
money on costs associated with procurement, storage, maintenance, and disposal by 
placing these requirements on Michelin.  This privatization effort provides the warfighter 
direct benefits as they now receive their supplies from Michelin, who provides direct delivery 
of these commodities from their stock. As of Calendar 2009, Michelin and the DLA have 
delivered 9,235 orders for 26,636 tires, with the average delivery time of 1.97 days and a 
98.9% on-time delivery rate.  Program-to-date, the on-time delivery rate has been 98.5% 
and a 100% fill rate—with no backorders incurred and with a project annual savings of $46 
million (NSSC, 2009). 
HASC Panel on Acquisition Reform 
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition 
Reform was appointed by Chairman Ike Skelton and then-Ranking Member John McHugh in 
March 2009 to carry out a comprehensive review of the defense acquisition system. The 
HASC review was motivated by the lack of responsive within the DoD acquisition system to 
today’s mission needs, not rigorous enough in protecting taxpayers, and not disciplined 
enough in the acquisition of weapons systems for tomorrow’s wars (HASC, 2010). The 
Panel took a year to perform its review, holding 12 hearings and numerous briefings 
covering a broad range of issues in defense acquisition.  
The Panel found that while the environment of defense acquisition has significantly 
changed, the defense acquisition system has not, with the current acquisition system 
structured largely for the acquisition of weapon systems at a time when the acquisition of 
services, and of information technology, represents a much larger portion of the DoD 
budget. The Panel also reported that there is little commonality across the defense 
acquisition system with the acquisition of weapon systems, commercial goods, commodities, 
services, and information technology. The Panel recommended the following: 
 A Rapid Acquisition Fielding Agency be created to meet urgent operational 
needs, and the “DoD and Congress should not accept development timelines 
routinely measured in double digits.”  
 Recognize accelerated life cycle for IT acquisition (including embedded 
software). Defense related IT systems are typically taking 2-3 years to deliver; a 
time-frame that ensures the technology is two to three generations out of date by 
the time it is delivered. 
 Achieve auditable financial systems. The Panel recommended The Under 
Sectary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Comptrollers of the military 
departments should rely more on individual obligation and expenditure plans for 





 Expand outreach to commercial/small business. The Panel recommended 
improving competition and access to more innovative technology by utilizing 
more of the industrial base, especially small and mid-tier businesses. 
 Enhance requirements process and analytics with “greater emphasis on the up-
front market analysis to best leverage limited funds by buying good solutions 
from the commercial market when they are available, and husbanding resources 
for development for instances when there is no other provider.” 
These recommendations directly enhance effects-based requirement, commercial-
like R&D (for IT systems), and a healthy, competitive industrial base. The effect on these 
recommendations is dependent upon DoD implementation. 
Initial Assessment 
As summarized, Congress and the DoD initiated significant acquisition reform efforts 
simultaneously. As noted, several of the reform provisions are not strategically aligned. 
Furthermore, in some cases, DoD implementation has extended development and 
procurement timelines, demonstrating a lack of agility. Finally, DoD and congressional 
desires to expand the industrial base (to include more innovative, mid-sized companies) 
must be enabled by life cycle processes that foster greater private-sector involvement. 
Current reform efforts to expand oversight, extend development and test, and insource may 
actually inhibit greater commercial involvement. 
Based upon these considerations, an initial assessment of the effect of current 
reform efforts on agility and affordability is shown in Table 2. As presented, across the 
numerous reform efforts, positive steps are being taken to address warfighter-focused 
requirements, commercial-like R&D for IT systems, and outcome-based sustainment. 
Unfortunately, these positive indicators are offset by other aspects of reform such as 





Table 2. Initial Assessment of Reform Efforts 
LS10-0102-02 1










- - 9 9 -
Competitive industrial 
base 9 - 9 9 9
Enhanced DoD 
workforce 9 - 9 9 9
 
Recommendations 
Based on this initial assessment of DoD acquisition reform policy efforts and their 
potential impact of those efforts on the inherent, structural incentives that are embedded in 
DoD life cycle processes, the following policy actions are recommended: 
1. Accelerate requirement process reform: Incentivize industry to control 
requirements creep, select mature technologies for product integration, and 
develop solutions in an incremental and timely fashion with the timely and 
collaborative development of requirements and potential solutions at the 
commencement of the specific program. Increase requirements acceleration 
by increasing the reliance on commercially available systems and 
subsystems. 
1. Strategically balanced insourcing and desire for competitive industrial 
base:  Implement and enforce a deliberate and systematic approach 
to insourcing based on facts and analysis, including business case 
analysis and the full consideration of inherently governmental 
positions, as well as core competencies. Simultaneously, the DoD 
needs to continue to cultivate partnerships with industry.  If the DoD is 
to capitalize on a competitive commercial market, insourcing efforts 
must allow commercially knowledgeable acquisition personnel to join 
the federal workforce. 
2. Develop competitive sustainment framework consistent with NDAA, 
Section 805:  Maximize the value of Department of Defense funding 
by providing the best possible product support outcomes at the lowest 
operations and support cost. This is achieved by providing guidance 





support manager to consider competitive alternatives at the system, 
subsystem, and component level every five years. 
3. Transition fielded systems to outcome-based sustainment: Implement 
an outcomes-based sustainment model and strengthen total life cycle 
systems management, Depot Maintenance Partnering, and Condition-
Based Maintenance, enabling end-to-end weapon system 
support,providing required readiness at reduced costs. 
As the United States advances into the 21st century, the DoD will continue to be 
faced with the challenge of maintaining a persistent expeditionary military presence while 
engaged in a long-term conflict.  Victory in part, will be measured by the DoD’s ability to 
effectively sustain and maintain equipment, while concurrently preserving its ability to 
display flexibility in meeting the evolving and changing operational conditions of irregular 
warfare and stateless actors.  Furthermore, both the global economic environment and the 
requirements associated with growing competition for scarce resources generate conditions 
in which the DoD will have to do more with less. 
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